Abstract: Financial support for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in underrepresented host countries was agreed on at the Copenhagen conference. The EU rules include special import quotas for Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from Least Developed Countries (LDCs). This paper discusses whether these measures can contribute to overcoming barriers to CDM development in LDCs, how Programmes of Activities (PoAs) are performing, and how CDM projects and PoAs contribute to sustainable development in LDCs. CER supply and demand scenarios for 2013-2020 show that preferential access measures for LDCs would not have an important impact on CDM in these countries if the barriers for project implementation are not overcome. The specific CDM projects and PoAs found in LDCs yield potentially high sustainable development benefits. Through a comparison between the climate regime and the Lomé Convention, a preferential access agreement in agricultural trade, we conclude that not just preferential access is important, but also reduced access costs and the removal of underlying barriers. Increased incentives for added-value products characterise the Lomé success stories. For the climate regime, this could be translated into additional financial incentives for CDM projects with added value. As LDCs host a high share of them, PoAs could constitute an opportunity here. 
Introduction
Through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), greenhouse gas emission reduction credits from projects in developing countries can be acquired by industrialised countries to comply with their Kyoto Protocol emission reduction targets. By October 2010 (UNEP Risoe Centre, 2010), the CDM had mobilised over 5500 projects, out of which 2400 had been registered with the CDM Executive Board (EB) and have the potential to generate Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). About 2.8 billion CERs are expected from these projects by 2012.
The CDM project portfolio is very unevenly distributed across host countries. China, India and
Brazil account for about 72% of projects and 76% of expected CERs. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) host just 61 CDM projects in the pipeline (1.1%), of which only 19 projects are registered.
This uneven distribution of the CDM has been repeatedly criticised, as it directly affects both countries' expectations of receiving CDM-related financial flows, and the realisation of the second goal of this mechanism, which is to contribute to sustainable development (SD) in its host countries. Already in 2001, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) called for the EB to report "to the COP/MOP on the regional and subregional distribution of CDM project activities with a view to identifying systematic or systemic barriers to their equitable distribution" (UNFCCC, 2001: 28) . The COP/MOP (the Conference of the Parties acting as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) confirmed this at its first meeting in 2005, asking the EB also to suggest options to address these barriers, and to broaden participation in the CDM (UNFCCC, 2005: 98) . The
Copenhagen conference in 2009 decided that simplified procedures for demonstrating the additionality of very small projects would be introduced, payment of registration fees would be postponed and upfront financing for CDM project validation and registration would be provided for projects in hitherto underrepresented countries (UNFCCC, 2009) . Analysts are also discussing other ways of differentiating countries in the CDM. Proposed means include: differentiated eligibility of CDM host countries, discounting of emission reduction credits from different host countries, introducing a cap to the amount of emission credits that can be issued from projects in each country, and a more directed allocation of demand towards particular host countries (Bakker et al., 2009; Castro and Michaelowa, 2010) . Also, some buyers like the EU envisage special import quotas for CERs from LDCs or Small Island Developing States (SIDSs), as discussed in section 4.2.
The issue of the sustainable development contribution of CDM projects has been widely discussed in the literature, through literature reviews (e.g. Olsen, 2007) , case studies of individual projects (Borges da Cunha, 2007 , Cole, 2007 Lenzen et al., 2007; Rudolph, 2007; Sirohi, 2007) , systematic analyses of several CDM projects (Sutter and Parreño, 2007; Olsen and Fenhann, 2008) , and attempts at creating objective tools to measure SD benefits (Sutter, 2003; SouthSouthNorth, 2004; Olsen and Fenhann, 2008; Lenzen et al., 2007) . As host countries' expectations of generating financial flows and SD benefits depend on their attractiveness for CER buyers, this discussion remains relevant.
The following questions thus arise: Could preferential access measures such as the ones described above really improve the participation of LDCs in the CDM? Could such improved participation generate sustainable development benefits in LDCs? Can new modalities of CDM projects, such as the Programmes of Activities (PoAs) 1 , which aim to target more distributed emission sources, provide a contribution?
In this paper, we first discuss the current and potential supply of the CDM in LDCs, and present an overview of the barriers limiting CDM development in poor countries. In section 3, we describe the proposals in the international climate negotiations and in the EU climate and energy package to promote CER supply from LDCs and underrepresented CDM host countries. Section 4 develops possible CER supply and demand scenarios for the period 2013-2020. For estimating the supply, we use an extrapolation of the figures provided by the UNEP Risoe Center CDM Pipeline on the current CER supply, corrected for the project approval and credit issuance rates, and assuming different post-2012 regulatory scenarios. For the demand, we project the baseline emissions of developed countries until 2020 and assume a range of likely emission reduction targets and of supplementarity in the use of CDM credits.
In section 5 we assess the impact of preferential access policies on CER supply from LDCs, and the potential sustainable development benefits from CDM projects and PoAs in LDCs. In section 6 we draw a comparison between a preferential access agreement in the agricultural trade system and the climate regime, before concluding in section 7. (Jung, 2005) . Furthermore, familiarity between investing country and host country (operationalised as past bilateral trade, bilateral aid and colonial relationship) was found by Dolšak and Bowerman Crandall (2007) to be an even more important factor in explaining CDM location decisions.
The CDM in LDCs
More specific barriers for CDM implementation in LDCs, especially in SSA, have been thoroughly discussed within the Nairobi Framework. This initiative was launched at COP/MOP2 in Nairobi (2006) with the aim of helping these countries to improve their level of participation in the CDM (see Muyungi (2006) , Agyemang-Bonsu (2007) , Ellis and Kamel (2007) , Kinkead (2007) , UNEP (2007) , and the World Bank (2007)).
One of the barriers most frequently mentioned is the limited institutional and technical capacity to develop and implement CDM projects. In the public sector, it is not only the DNAs that need to be established and have a minimum budget, but also the institutional framework for the sectors involved in the project (e.g. energy) is crucial. In the private sector, the presence of trained national CDM consultants is essential for coping with the complex CDM rules at affordable costs. The limited access to financing is an equally important barrier. On the one hand, domestic financial institutions lack capacity and awareness of the CDM as an investment option. On the other, the unattractive investment climate in these countries discourages foreign investors. Indeed, the CDM mainly functions as an additional revenue source for companies that already have financing. Annex I countries and companies are investing in CDM projects only in countries where they are already present (e.g. through subsidiary electricity companies), where they see a market for their products, and where stability is guaranteed (Lütken and Michaelowa, 2008) .
There are few possibilities to develop large CDM projects in LDCs, as the energy demand and industry are still small in these countries 2 . In Africa, the largest emission reduction potential lies in sectors that are not significant in the CDM at present (forestry, agriculture, reducing the use of non-renewable biomass), and the low grid emission factors make grid-connected renewable energy and energy efficiency projects less viable. However, while many observers assumed that small projects were not viable through the CDM due to the high transaction costs (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005) , nowadays there is a noteworthy amount of very small 8 CDM projects in the pipeline (see Figure 1) and Programmes of Activities are starting to take off, which suggests that the transaction-cost barrier can be overcome.
Another important barrier is the availability of data for baselines and monitoring: gathering this information is too costly for just one or two projects, so nobody makes this effort. Finally, the lack of infrastructure (roads, large equipment but also laboratories for calibrating measurement devices) is another limiting factor for the CDM in LDCs.
Figure 1 approximately here
It is however possible to overcome these barriers, as the case of Honduras shows. Honduras is not a LDC, but a small and poor country, with an unstable political regime and unattractive investment climate. Corruption and crime are high, access to finance difficult. Despite substantial CDM capacity building and financial support for establishing a functional DNA, staff replacement after changes of government has led to losses in institutional capabilities.
As most of its electricity is produced from fossil sources, Honduras has some mitigation potential from renewable energy. Additionally, Honduras was an early mover in the privatisation of the electricity sector in Central America, and financial incentives for renewable energy are in place. However, its electricity system is highly inefficient, and prices can only be sustained due to subsidies (Keller, 2008; Lokey, 2008; Figueres, 2002) . Nevertheless, Honduras hosts 32 CDM projects, 16 of which are registered (UNEP Risoe Centre, 2010).
Honduras has apparently benefited from the leadership of a strong group of entrepreneurs in the renewable sector, who initiated all the CDM projects and created an association that allowed them to pool and share their experience. There is also a local CDM consultancy and a couple of international ones with a presence in the country (Keller, 2008; Lokey, 2008 The package includes a provision with high relevance for LDCs. For the non-trading sectors, In the case that a new international climate agreement is reached, only credits from countries that have ratified this agreement will be accepted from 2013.
Further qualitative criteria restricting the acceptance of credits in the EU system from 2013 onwards are still possible. The qualitative criteria discussed so far include accepting only renewable energy and energy efficiency projects, or only "high quality" projects. While it has been speculated that "high quality" could mean credits that are not based on reductions of industrial gases (this is even more likely now after the recent debates on industrial gas projects, see endnote 5), or credits that are based on projects with a clear sustainable development component, and/or credits with stronger additionality substantiation, this term was never clearly defined officially.
Since the Copenhagen Accord did not yield any new legally binding emission reduction targets for industrialised countries after 2012, so far, the EU climate package is currently the only legally-defined market for CDM projects after 2012. This is why this single policy is, currently, so important for the future of the CDM.
Some questions remain as to the extent to which these measures can boost CDM development in LDCs: Are other Annex I countries going to match this EU initiative, and to what extent? Will the financial and technical barriers for CDM development in LDCs be overcome through these measures? And even if they are, will LDCs be able to match this demand with an adequate supply?
In the following section, in order to try to answer these questions, we present a few possible post-2012 climate policy and carbon demand scenarios, which will be matched with our estimations of carbon credit supply from CDM projects.
Post-2012 climate policy and market demand-supply scenarios
In order to assess the effect of possible preferential access for LDCs and other policy scenarios for the future CDM, we create carbon credit demand and supply scenarios with and without an international agreement for the period 2013-2020.
Demand scenarios
For the demand scenario with no international agreement, we take the announced 20% reduction for the EU, and the greenhouse gas reduction targets announced by other Annex I governments till mid-2009, which are not contingent on an international agreement. For the scenario with an international agreement, we take the 30% target for the EU and tighter targets for other Annex I governments, which we expect could be agreed during the coming negotiations. We build three demand scenarios, as described in Table 2 . In the EU-27 case, we assume that CERs are required to be supplementary to domestic emissions reductions, as this group has already announced that only 50% of the effort may be covered by emissions credits. For the other countries, we assume that a range between 50% and 100% of the required reductions could be covered through the CDM. We choose, where available (Australia and other European countries), the low emissions path projections, which also account for some domestic mitigation action. Another key influence is the development of post-2012 negotiations, including present Annex B countries pressing for increased mitigation actions by developing countries, and, as outlined above, possible limitations on the import of CERs on the basis of "quality" considerations.
Due to these manifold influences, it is extremely difficult to forecast future CER volumes.
Besides the inflow of new project types and projects of types that are already in the CDM pipeline, the key parameters influencing supply are the delay of project implementation, nonvalidation rate of submitted projects, the rejection rate of validated projects and the performance rate of registered projects. We therefore derive our supply scenarios based on been used in deriving the scenarios. Thus, the only way in which we make the demand influence our supply estimations is when we assume some policy-related restrictions to the acceptability of CDM projects.
We use the following formulae to project CER supply volumes:
(1): CERs projected up to 2020 from CDM projects registered until 2012:
Where: performance is set at 98% of predicted CER generation as achieved in the past. We use this figure for the CER issuance rate in the business-as-usual case. However, issuance performance varies greatly across project types, so that the median performance is only 82%. We use this median for modelling stricter CDM supply scenarios. Therefore, the impact of delays depends on the shape of the CER inflow over time. Assuming that the crediting period of all projects coming in during a year would on average begin in the middle of this year, the discount of CERs due to delay can be quantified in the following functional form: We assume, for all projects, that the delay in project implementation averages 6 months.
Using the formulas and parameters described above, we generate seven CER supply scenarios for the period 2013-2020. In a very strict scenario (Scenario A), only the credits generated from projects registered up to 2012 would be accepted in the global carbon market. In a status quo scenario (B), the CDM would continue with the same rules, stringency, range of host countries and project types as today, continuing to increase credit supply beyond 2012. Following a "high quality CERs" demand policy by the EU, Annex I countries could agree to no longer accept credits from industrial gas projects (Scenario C).
Annex I countries could agree to only accept CERs from LDCs for projects registered after 2012 (Scenario D). Additional measures to create appropriate incentives that promote CDM development in LDCs, added to the rule depicted in Scenario D, would form an active LDCpromotion scenario (Scenario D2). Stronger pressure by developing countries to accept REDD (reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation) and CCS projects and clarify rules for programmatic CDM could lead to a larger CDM supply (Scenario E). Finally, a stricter "high quality" scenario would allow CERs from post-2012 projects with stricter additionality considerations and again without industrial gas projects (Scenario F). 
Estimating quantitative impact of scenarios on CER demand from LDCs

Supply-demand balance
The combination of our CER supply and demand scenarios is shown in Table 5 . In this analysis we have disregarded the potential supply from JI projects. We do this because this instrument suffers from delays in host country approval, and because it also constitutes mitigation effort in Annex I countries.
Table 5 approximately here
These figures show that the balance between supply and demand of CERs depends largely on whether there is an international agreement (resulting in larger demand) and on whether the CER contribution to abatement in Annex I countries is capped or not (supplementarity).
Without an agreement and with a cap to the use of CERs of 50% of the mitigation effort in all Annex I countries, CER oversupply is very likely. With an agreement, it is very likely that the CDM would not provide sufficient credits to cover the potential demand during 2013-2020, even with 50% supplementarity. The scenario with the financial crisis -which also assumes an international agreement is reached -has similar results to the scenario with agreement.
It should be noted that several of these combinations are unlikely. Under a scenario with no agreement, for example, it is unlikely that the CDM will be significantly enlarged, as Annex I countries will not be willing to finance further projects in developing countries. It is also unlikely that having not reached an agreement on climate change mitigation, all Annex I countries would then agree to only accept high quality CERs. However, some parties or groups (such as the EU) could decide to implement these limitations unilaterally. Thus, while not completely realistic, the combination of scenarios shows an overall picture of the range of possible balances in the future carbon credit market from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic possibilities. 
Potential sustainable development benefits from CDM projects and PoAs in LDCs
If we apply Olsen and Fenhann's (2008) SD taxonomy to the CDM project types most frequently seen in LDCs, we see that these projects potentially have relatively high SD contributions: four of the five most frequent project types have on average 3 to 3.5 clearly identified SD benefits per project; with only biomass energy projects having less than 3 SD benefits per project 7 . While the benefits from hydro and biomass projects are distributed in the social and economic areas, those from reforestation stem mostly from the environmental area, and those from biogas and landfill gas projects come mostly from both environmental and social improvements (see Figure 6 ).
Figure 6 approximately here
The project types used in PoAs are mainly very small, dispersed technologies, as foreseen by the regulators. Agricultural waste and household energy efficiency projects (compact fluorescent lamps and stoves) dominate, followed by solar water heaters and photovoltaics which according to Olsen and Fenhann 2008) are among the CDM project types with the highest SD benefit potential (see Figure 7 ). Most PoAs (88%) are small-scale. Most technologies are likely to have substantial social benefits.
Figure 7 approximately here
Generally, PoAs have a high "leverage", i.e. if they are successful, they can expand quickly without any further delays in the CDM project cycle. For example, an Indian PoA aims at distributing 400 million compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs). However, drawing on our knowledge of CFL projects, we estimate the total volume of lamps distributed by the end of 2012 by the three PoAs in the pipeline at 90 million. For stove PoAs, the total volume could reach 3.5 million stoves by that time. 1.7 million domestic biogas plants and 1350 swine farm digesters could become operational before 2013, which would be in the same order of magnitude as the most successful development assistance projects covering these technologies.
While PoAs still have to show that they actually generate the large reductions they foresee, they could allow LDCs to harness an eventual preferential access to the CDM market. A clear indicator is that some private sector companies like JP Morgan and C Quest Capital are entering the PoA market in countries that would never be appealing for such companies in a "normal" business context. Thus, eventually, the development target of the CDM and the aim to generate cheap CERs could be reconciled.
Discussion of preferential access options
In the world trade system, there is a case that could be used to illustrate the effect of According to Cosgrove (1994) , ACP exports to Europe accounted for 3.4% of total EC imports in 1975, when the first Lomé Convention was signed. Due to the large growth in EC trade, ACP exports declined to 1.5% of EC imports in 1992. While ACP exports to the EC did grow, they could not keep pace with the growth in the European market. Cosgrove concludes that the Lomé Convention did not provide sufficient support to enable ACP countries to keep their market share, and that it therefore failed in its goals.
The preferences generated by Lomé for ACP exports were highly dependent on the barriers that the EC placed for trade in general. For agricultural products, the general rule is that the more processed the product is, the more barriers it faces. Thus, ACP countries would have benefited most from adding value to their raw materials and exporting them to Europe in processed form. Trade also depends on the current prices of commodities. During the 1980s and 90s, the prices of agricultural products mainly fell, which also had a negative impact on ACP trade. Finally, the increase in trade from the preferred country group also depends on the elasticity of demand for the product. The elasticity of demand for most ACP products in Europe is low, meaning that a lower price for them (offered by ACP countries) has little effect on their export volume (Cosgrove, 1994) .
Some non-traditional products have been identified as benefiting from the Lomé Convention, among them canned tuna, leather and leather products, fresh flowers, some vegetables, textiles and garments. Many of these products were subject to levies from the European common agricultural policy (CAP), and thus profited from a comparative advantage under
Lomé. In Mauritius, the strong specialization in sugar exports to the EC enabled the accumulation of funds that were used to shift the economy towards the textile industry, tourism and financial services (Laaksonen et al., 2007) . Despite these successes, the main barriers inhibiting ACP export performance could not be overcome by a trade agreement:
climatic conditions (droughts and desertification), crop and livestock diseases, lack of infrastructure leading to high transportation and communication costs, oil price increases, and AIDS continued to restrict the development and integration of ACP countries in the world market (Cosgrove, 1994) .
The Lomé experience provides lessons for the climate regime. Through Lomé, not just access to a market was secured, but that access came with fewer costs (no tariffs or levies). In the climate regime, CDM projects from LDC countries benefit from a zero registration fee.
However, registration is only a small fraction of CDM transaction costs, whose bulk encompasses PDD development, methodology development (if needed) and validation.
Providing upfront financing for PDD development and validation in countries with little CDM development has been agreed on, but funds are limited. If similar financing, for example, for the coordination of PoAs with high SD benefits could be provided, not only could the CDM potential of LDCs be realised, but also a better contribution to local development could be made. It would be important, however, to keep these incentives targeted specifically at LDCs.
In the EU climate package, some degree of preferential access for CDM projects from LDCs has been secured, but no provisions are yet in place for further supporting the implementation of these projects. As seen in the Lomé experience, the underlying causes of poor countries' lack of competitiveness need to be addressed.
Furthermore, in Lomé, success was observed for special types of products with added value.
A parallel could be made here to CDM project types with added value (sustainable development benefits or stricter additionality, for example), but only if this added value is transformed into some kind of financial incentive that supports these projects. This kind of differentiation between project types is not yet in place in the climate regime. PoAs could constitute an opportunity in this context. These programmes seem to have a stronger focus on small-scale projects with higher SD benefits than individual CDM projects, and so far represent a higher share in LDCs. Thus, special quotas or special treatment for PoAs could be an opportunity to introduce such a differentiation, without explicitly differentiating between project types or host countries.
A further issue is the source of financing for such preferences. In the Lomé conventions, the EU was a relatively homogeneous group of countries that could agree on securing financing for the trade and aid components of the agreements. In the climate regime, while the Copenhagen Accord led to a generic pledge by industrialised countries to finance mitigation and adaptation in developing countries, the modalities for this finance are still unclear (see Roberts et al., 2010 for a discussion on open questions about the finance promise, and WRI, 2010 for a summary of the financial pledges with comments on whether they are new and additional).
The discussion of compatibility with the international trade regime is a final lesson that can be learned from the Lomé experience. While it is not clear whether the CERs deriving from CDM projects can be considered as "goods" or "services" that are regulated under the WTO, analysts suggests that, in this case, preferential treatment towards CERs from specific origin could be deemed non-WTO conform. Thus, authors discussing the interface between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO suggest that caution should be taken to avoid potential disputes between both regimes -for instance through clear definition of the nature of emission reduction credits (for detailed discussions see Kim, 2000; Wiser, 2000; and, more recently, Howse and Eliason, 2009 ).
Conclusions
The current and potential supply of CDM projects from Least Developed Countries is low as many barriers prevent their participation in the carbon market. However, the case of Drawing a comparison between preferential access agreements in the agricultural trade system (Lomé Conventions) and the climate regime, we find further evidence that not just preferential access is important, but also reduced access costs. The current registration fee exemption for LDCs represents only a small fraction of CDM transaction costs and is probably not enough. The now agreed loan for PDD development and validation of CDM projects will be applicable to all countries with less than 10 CDM projects, diluting the benefit for LDCs. An opportunity could arise if similar financing could be provided for PoAs, which have a much higher share in LDCs. Furthermore, the limited impact of the Lomé agreements on ACP trade was partly due to the fact that the underlying causes of lack of competitiveness were not addressed. In the climate regime, if CDM implementation barriers are not directly addressed, the CDM might remain a dream for poor countries. Increased incentives for products with added value led to the few success stories in the Lomé framework. For the climate regime, this could be translated into added financial incentives for CDM projects with added valuehowever this may be interpreted. Again, PoAs could constitute an opportunity here, as they so far seem to focus on project types with higher SD benefits. Finally, financing was identified as a critical issue for undertaking these measures: if financial incentives for special projects or specific regions are to be created, clear rules for their provision and distribution will need to be reached and enforced. they have been criticised because the CDM revenue largely exceeds the cost of reducing the emissions and can even exceed the value of the refrigerant production (Wara, 2006) .
Notes
The CDM may thus provide the perverse incentive of increasing production in order to receive more revenues. In the last few months, new criticism has arisen due to apparent flaws in the baseline methodology for these projects, which would allow such perverse incentives to subsist (CDM Methodologies Panel, 2010; Schneider et al., 2010) .
6: If a project suffers a delay in its registration when its operations have already started, it will lose the CERs for the emission reductions achieved before the date of registration.
As project developers can change the start date of a project's crediting period once after registration by simple communication to the CDM Executive Board, a delay of implementation for an already registered project does not lead to an overall loss of CERs during the crediting period, but to a loss compared to the quantity estimated to accrue by a specific date.
7: As a comparison, among the projects analysed by Olsen and Fenhann (2008) , N 2 O projects have the least SD benefits (one benefit/project on average), and energy distribution projects have the most (5.5 benefits/project), followed by energy efficiency in households (4 benefits/project). Note: During the Copenhagen meeting and in the Copenhagen Accords, some of these pledges were restructured or strengthened. However, the new pledges are non-binding and most of them are also conditional on, for example, a legally-binding agreement. Thus, the reduction levels we assume here are still realistic. higher potential each year
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